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Abstract 
The design approach used and the 
experience gained in the building of four 
small satellite payloads is explained. 
Specific recommendations are made and the 
lessons learned on the SAMPEX program 
are detailed. 
Background 
The Special Payloads Division, 
formerly the Sounding Rocket Division. has 
a long heritage of designing and building 
scientific payloads for a variety of launch 
vehicles. After years of building sounding 
rocket. balloon. and high altitude aircraft 
payloads, the division took on the design of 
Spartan, Get Away Special, and Hitchhiker 
payloads for the Space Shuttle. 
After designing, building and flying 
Pegsat, the first Pegasus payload, the 
Special Payloads Division with help from 
other Engineering Directorate Divisions was 
chosen to build the SMail EXplorer (SMEX) 
series spacecraft. The first of these, 
SAMPEX, was launched on a Scout rocket in 
July 1992. The second,FAST, is undergoing 
Engineering Test Unit (ETU) developmentfor 
launch in Summer 94. The third, SWAS, is 
scheduled to fly in Fall 95. Four more are 
in a phase AlB study for launch in the 97-98 
time frame. 
The goal of the SMEX program is to produce 
small, cheap, satellites in a short time frame. 
Design drivers/requirements 
The drivers for mechanical design are 
a combination of the science requirements, 
spacecraft subsystems, the launch vehicle 
constraints and the physical realities of 
space flight. The science requirements 
determine the instrument component, the 
attitude control system, the data system, the 
power system, and the desired orbit. 
The launch vehicle imposes weight and 
volume constraints as well as launch loads 
and operational requirements. The space 
environment imposes a severe thermal and 
radiation environment that is orbit dependent. 
The instruments and other on board 
components have structural and thermal 
limits that must not be exceeded. There also 
are special instrument requirements for field 
of view and magnetic and optical cleanliness. 
Accommodating the desired science 
requirements of these missions for launch on 
a small launch vehicle has demanded 
custom mechanical designs. So far each of 
the four small satellites we have designed, 
PEGSAT, SAMPEX, FAST, and SWAS have 
had a unique structure and mechanical 
subsystem. 
Tight budgets and schedules as well as 
minimal weight are design drivers. 
It is important early on to pin down the 
true design requirements. 
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The lead engineer 
Our approach to the design has been 
to assign a lead mechanical engineer to the 
project as soon as possible, and have him/or 
her do the initial layouts to propose a 
possible design and get the necessary inputs 
and comments from the other leads. Giving 
all the subsystem lead engineers authority as 
well as responsibility allows them to operate 
as a team and achieve the necessary 
iterations to a final design. The design 
process is necessarily a highly iterative one. 
Peer reviews both formal and informal 
should be frequently held to encourage 
innovative thinking not just to make sure that 
the design only uses existing ("flight provenN) 
techniques. 
The lead mechanical engineer is 
responsible for his budget and scheduling as 
well as the design, analysis, drawings, 
fabrication, assembly and qualification of the 
hardware. It is a lot of responsibility to 
reside in one individual, but he/or she does 
have branch support and the spacecraft are 
small enough for this to be possible. This 
placement of the responsibility in a few 
individuals across the subsystems is what 
makes it possible for the small satellite to be 
H -faster -better -cheaper II 
This is a people oriented team 
approach. The subsystem leads operate 
outside of their boxes on the "orgU chart. A 
parallel systems engineering approach 
develops among the subsystem leads that 
complements the roll of the project systems 
engineer in preventing items from falling 
between the cracks of organization and 
becoming real problems. 
Keeping the team of lead engineers 
intact from design through integration, test 
and launch is vital. 
Design considerations 
The basic design principle is to 
minimize the load path from the mass of the 
spacecraft to the launch vehicle interface 
while providing the instruments with the 
required field of view, thermal enVironment, 
and the other subsystems required. 
Thermal 
In a small satellite everything except 
appendages tends to run at the same 
temperature, which simplifies the 
thermal/mechanical design. However 
thermal considerations are still a major 
influence on the design and must not be an 
afterthought. Blanketing, radiator panels, 
and battery or experiment isolation are more 
difficult than on a larger spacecraft. 
Ground service equipment 
Proper attention must be paid to 
ground service eqUipment during design; 
not as an afterthought. 
Areas of concern are: 
Turnover 'fixtures, 
Test fixtures, 
Lifting rigs, 
Lifting points on the spacecraft, 
Dollies, 
Battery cooling, 
Access to vital spots on spacecraft, 
Shipping containers, 
Clean room accommodation, 
Mechanisms 
If you must use mechanisms, make them 
simple, reliable, and easy to test in one "g". 
Don't make them overly complicated striving 
for "redundancy". It is very difficult to 
increase the reliability of a mechanism by 
making it more complicated. Allow for 
thermal blankets on the structure as well as 
the mechanism. Don't make heaters and 
blankets an afterthought. Don't make 
connectors and wiring an afterthought either. 
Go through a thorough test program. 
Operate the mechanism in several 
orientations to prove that gravity is not 
helping too much and be wary of "g" 
negation systems. 
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Other design considerations 
Allow for the cable harness that 
connects the boxes and provide for its 
mounting. Visualize it as at least a garden 
hose. Before the advent of computer busses 
as interfaces we used fire hose to mock up 
a satellite harness. Also allow for 
connectors and the minimum bend radius of 
the cable. 
Analysis 
After the initial design layout is made a 
simple analysis is run, often by hand, to 
check the initial assumptions on the primary 
load path. Later on a simple finite element 
model is made and the frequencies are 
checked and structure is examined to reduce 
weight and increase margins if necessary. 
Eventually a complete model of the final 
design will be made to run a coupled loads 
analysis with the launch vehicle. Even this 
model need not be too detailed. After all this 
is supposed to be a finite not infinite element 
analysis. 
Fracture analysis is not necessary, 
but is used on pieces that are not subject to 
strength testing to comply with the structural 
reliability requirements. All subsystems 
mechanical designs, including experiments 
and electronics boxes, should be reviewed 
by a mechanical engineer and have at least 
cursory or "back of the envelope" stress 
calculations. Finally everything should be 
subject to thorough testing with plainly stated 
goals and enough analysis to know what 
levels are really being tested to. 
Testing 
Building a mechanical Engineering 
Test Unit (ETU) has proven to be 
essential to maintaining the tight 
schedule that these small satellites are 
built on. 
The ETU is used to run mechanical fit 
and interface verification checks. These fit 
checks are run with the launch vehicle and 
every other piece of hardware as early as 
possible and every time there is the 
possibility of a design change. A high fidelity 
ETU frees the flight unit to continue 
integration while these important checks are 
made. It also allows lifting and other 
handling schemes to be worked out and 
practiced without endangering the 1'Iight unit. 
The ETU is also subject to thorough loads 
and vibration testing and a modal survey to 
qualify the structure. If there are 
mechanisms, they are subject to these tests 
and a thermal vacuum test as well as 
deployment tests. 
Testing is not limited to GSFC 
facilities but is preformed at Wallops Is. 
Langley or anywhere else that makes sense. 
Documentation 
The earlier that Interface Control 
Documents and drawings can be agreed to, 
the better. Less cost will accrue to program 
and life will actually be made easier. 
Having said that; minimize documentation to 
what is actually needed. Lead engineers in 
close contact can dramatically reduce the 
formal paper flow while still maintaing the 
communication necessary. 
Control and minimize changes 
Avoid requirement creep ... we often try 
to go the extra mile for the experimenter and 
incur the extra month, pound and dollar. 
Avoid unnecessary changes but quickly 
accommodate the necessary ones and pray 
the project has the wisdom to differentiate 
between them. 
Conclusion 
If a small satellite is going to be 
"faster -better -cheaper" it is going to be, as 
Dr. Len Fisk said on 1/25/89 ... 
"A grown-up sounding rocket, not a scaled 
down great observatory" 
Specific SAMPEX lessons learned1 
Interface verification 
Fit check everything as early as 
possible. We fit checked most of the 
SAMPEX components on the ETU structure 
early in development. There were a few 
problems but there was plenty of time to 
correct them. There were a number of items 
not checked due to the unavailability of the 
components. 
During flight unit integration the 
majority of items that were not fit checked on 
the ETU didn't fit properly. Some required 
only quick Afite to fit" modifications but one 
required complete redesign of an instrument 
housing and significant rework of the 
spacecraft structure with significant cost and 
schedule impact. 
All these items had ICD drawings. 
The problem was that either the hardware 
didn't match the drawings or that changes 
made in one side of the interface were not 
followed up and incorporated into the other 
side. 
GSE and test fixtures also need to be 
fit checked. We had our mass properties 
test fixture available several weeks before 
the test. When we were ready to run the 
test we discovered the fixture didn't fit on the 
mass properties table. This was due to the 
drawing being misread. If we would have fit 
checked the fixture as soon as it was 
available we could have discovered the 
problem and fixed it long before we went to 
test saving ourselves one more aggravating 
delay. 
LESSON LEARNED: People make honest 
mistakes and ICD drawings aren't always 
correct or complete. Fit checks are the only 
way to verify the interface and the earlier 
they are done· the easier it is to correct 
problems. 
Control and Minimize Changes 
The HILT instrument was integrated 
and then removed for some rework including 
adding heaters and thermostats. When we 
went to reinstall HILT it wouldn't fit properly. 
The wire bundle for the heaters and 
thermostats was causing an interference 
problem which required rerouting of the 
wiring. 
In another incident, after we had 
performed the vehicle heat-shield fit check 
we added a small air conditioning tube to 
cool the spacecraft battery on the launch 
pad. When we went to install the heat-shield 
there was interference with the air 
conditioning tube and we had to cut it off on 
the pad to allow heat-shield installation. 
LESSON LEARNED: Don't change anything 
after fit checks are completed. If a change 
can't be avoided make sure the change is 
communicated explicitly and incorporated 
into the other affected interfaces. Then 
recheck the interface. 
Mechanical Design Lessons 
SAMPEX Antenna Problem 
The structure of the SAMPEX 
antenna consisted of a fiberglass tube into 
which a fiberglass plug was bonded to form 
the base. In this plug was installed a heli-
coil insert by which a #10-32 screw was 
used to attach the antenna to its mounting 
bracket. 
Both antennas were mounted to their 
respective brackets with high strength (160 
KSI) #10-32 screws and torqued to 55 in-Ibs. 
This was the standard torque value we used 
for this type screw. The spacecraft then 
went through complete vibration and thermal 
vacuum testing without incident (regarding 
the antennas). The antennas were then 
removed for component level checkouts. 
Upon reinstallation of the antennas a 
"pop" was heard during torquing of the upper 
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antenna. The antenna was removed and a 
crack was discovered running across the 
base plug. The lower antenna was later 
removed and it was found to be cracked 
also. 
The root cause of the problem was 
that there was no mechanical engineering 
involvement in the detailed design of the 
antenna. This led to the following specific 
problems which in combination caused the 
cracking: 
1. The torque of 55 in-Ib was not needed for 
this specific application. This torque 
provided a pre-load of over 1000 Ibs. to hold 
on antenna that weighed less than a quarter 
of a pound. 
2. 'The fibers in the base plug were 
unidirectional. The high stress from the 
screw pre-load was applied perpendicular to 
the fibers. With no fibers to carry the load 
the matrix simply cracked. 
3. The mating surface was not flat. The 
base plug was slightly recessed into the 
antenna tube and there were small bumps 
formed by the epoxy adhesive. These high 
spots created a bending load on the base 
plug when the screw was torqued. 
To correct this problem we first 
machined the base of the antennas flat, then 
pressed fit the antennas into a aluminum 
base cap. The pressed on base cap put the 
base plug into compression preventing any 
further cracking. We also reduced the screw 
torque to 15 in-lb. These antennas were 
requalified by component level vibration 
testing. 
LESSONS LEARNED: 
1. All mechanical designs should be 
reviewed by a mechanical engineer and 
have at least cursory or "back of the 
envelope" stress calculations. 
2. Use the appropriate screw torque for the 
given application. 
3. Make sure the fibers carry the load when 
using composite material especially when 
machining fiberglass parts from stock 
material. Make sure the fibers run in the 
correct direction(s). 
4. Specify flatness for critical mating 
surfaces. 
Tolerancing and Clearances 
Don't make tolerances and 
clearances tighter than needed. In a despin 
test failure, an out of spec cable ball wedged 
in its release slot where there was only .007 
inch nominal clearance. There was no need 
to have the clearance this tight and a small 
variance caused a failure. In another case 
we ran a battery air conditioning tube close 
the edge of an 8 inch square opening in the 
vehicle heat-shield. Due to normal variations 
and tolerance buildup the tube ran too close 
to the heat-shield and had to be cut off on 
the pad. We could have run the tube 2 
inches from the edge of the opening and had 
plenty of margin for error. 
Wire Harness Considerations 
Allow adequate space for wiring 
harness, de'fine routing concept early in 
deSign stage. Allow space for mating and 
securing connector fasteners, and for 
harness strain relief. Consider harness 
tiedown methods. 
Thermal Considerations 
Define thermal limits for mechanisms 
as early as possible. We had designed and 
built our ETU solar array mechanism before 
we had a firm worst case cold temperature. 
This temperature turned out to be much 
colder than we had anticipated. We had to 
add heaters and numerous thermal isolators 
to enable the mechanism to work at the cold 
limit. 
Review with the thermal engineer 
early on the mounting of thermally sensitive 
components such as batteries to provide 
proper mounting and heat paths for these 
components. Also review heater, thermostat 
and thermistor locations to allow ample 
space for them. 
Blanketing 
Allow ample time in the schedule for 
thermal blanket fitting and installation. Allow 
for blanket thickness in mechanical design 
especially around mechanisms. Blankets 
can be 1/4 inch thick or more. Don't make 
blankets an afterthought. 
Mechanical ETU Program 
An ETU of the structure and 
mechanical systems proved invaluable in the 
development of SAMPEX. It allowed early fit 
checks with ETU components where several 
discrepancies were discovered and corrected 
when there was still plenty of time in the 
schedule. 
The ETU allowed structural qualification and 
model verification to be completed early. 
Also vibration test response data from the 
ETU was used for component level testing. 
The ETU allows testing in parallel with the 
flight unit development. We were able to run 
solar array deployment and yo-yo despin 
tests on the ETU without impacting the flight 
schedule. 
The ETU was great for showing people what 
the spacecraft actually looked like, and 
working out details of the flight unit design 
such as for harness routing and thermal 
blanket details. 
The ETU allows performing tests that may 
be too risky to be performed on flight 
hardware. For example during despin 
testing a failed cable release caused the 
cable and weight to wrap around the ETU. 
This could have severely damaged the flight 
spacecraft but was incidental to the ETU. 
We also exercised all our lifting and turnover 
equipment on the ETU before it was used on 
the flight spacecraft. 
Testing Lessons 
Design mechanisms so that they can 
function in a one "g" environment if pOSSible, 
but take into account any deflections in the 
one "g" that will not be present in zero "gil. 
The SAMPEX solar arrays were designed to 
operate in one "gil and this enabled easy 
testing both ambient and in thermal vacuum. 
Put ETU hardware through the 
toughest testing. The SAMPEX ETU 
electronic boxes were only put through 
random vibration. Flight boxes were put 
through random, shock, and sine burst 
vibration testing. We should have put the 
ETU boxes through the tougher testing first 
to uncover any potential problems. Then the 
flight boxes could have been put through 
less stringent acceptance level tests. The 
same thing happened in EMI where ETU 
boxes were not EMI tested at the component 
level. The flight boxes were EMI tested 
when in actuality it was too late to do 
anything about problems that came up. 
Spin Balance Lessons 
We were able to balance the 
spacecraft with a filled unbaffled fluid tank 
with its centerline mounted on the spin axis, 
but this made the process a lot slower. 
Design in a place to mount balance 
weights. Ideally, the upper and lower 
circular balance planes should be as far 
apart as possible. Using a continuous circle 
avoids having to split the weights to fit at 
discreet points which requires greater total 
weight to achieve balance and takes more 
iterations. 
Design weights so that small amounts 
can be added or removed without disturbing 
the entire weight. We had weight stacks 
which had to be completely removed to 
adjust the weight. The slight misalignment 
from removing and reinstalling the weight 
stacks was enough to disturb the balance. 
Stick on weights for the final trimming would 
be a good idea. 
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Bring raw material to make weights to 
spin balance. We brought precut plates that 
we intended to stack to attain the proper 
weight. In one case we needed more weight 
than anticipated and had to rig up a huge, 
ugly, bolted together weight stack. If we had 
had material to cut new weights we could 
have done a faster, more structurally sound 
and aesthetic job. 
Balance is very sensitive; ounces, 
even grams of mass added or removed can 
throw the balance out of spec. For this 
reason spin balance should be performed as 
late as possible in the schedule to minimize 
the potential for changes which could affect 
the balance. 
Oespin Testing 
A yo-yo despin system will not despin 
to the predicted final spin rate if tested in air. 
If the final spin rate is critical, the system 
must be tested in vacuum. We tested our 
system in air and were unable to attain our 
target spin rate of 0 ± 3 rpm. In vacuum we 
easily met this goal. Although the tests in air 
did prove valuable in testing the function of 
the mechanism where some problems were 
uncovered. 
Miscellaneous Lessons 
Provide two sets of GSE such as 
lifting slings and dollies, if the cost is not 
prohibitive. This way one is available to use 
while the other is out being proof tested and 
inspected or is with the ETU for off site 
testing. 
Pyro actuators are long lead items. 
Order them early and get plenty of spares for 
functional testing. On our ETU we ran one 
ambient and four thermal vacuum solar array 
deployments, and five yo-yo despin 
deployments. We also ran two solar array 
deployments in thermal vacuum on the flight 
spacecraft. That's a total of twelve pyro 
activated test deployments and more pyros 
than that fired. 
Management/Operational Lessons 
Provide contingency time in schedule. 
We had virtually no contingency in the 
schedule during SAMPEX 1& T. This meant 
that any small glitch or delay threw the entire 
schedule into disarray and made it very 
difficult for people to plan work especially on 
nights and weekends. This was very 
aggravating for people who were already on 
the verge of burnout. Problems and delays 
are to be expected and contingency should 
be provided in the schedule to reduce the 
continuous reshuffling of the schedule. 
Most operational problems were 
caused by lack of communication and lack of 
clearly defined responsibilities for tasks not 
clearly under a specific subsystem. We had 
some of our most aggravating days 
performing what seemed like simple tasks. 
For example to ship the spacecraft to 
building 7 and get it set up in the thermal 
vacuum chamber was fraught with problems. 
The truck driver was told the wrong time to 
be there, no one in building 7 is expecting 
us, there is no crane operator ready, no 
lifting procedure, no one knows what clean 
room suits to wear, etc. etc. 
Find problems early. Problems found 
early are easy to fix. Problems found late in 
the game cause many late nights and gray 
hairs. Do whatever is possible to uncover 
problems early. Fit check everything, even 
if only a box enclosure is available. Test 
ETU hardware rigorously. 
Do tasks in parallel as much as 
possible. This is why ETU hardware is so 
valuable. It allows testing off line without 
affecting the flight spacecraft flow, saving 
valuable time. When you rush you make 
mistakes. When we were performing our 
last thermal vacuum test of the solar array 
we rushed to get the ETU ready for test and 
forgot to include some thermal isolators. 
This caused the test to fail. Luckily this 
was on the ETU and did not affect the flight 
spacecraft schedule, but we did have to work 
another weekend to fix the problem and pay 
for additional time in the thermal vacuum 
chamber. All because we were in too big of 
a hurry. 
Travel 
Travel pays for itself. We traveled to 
Max Plank Institute in Munich Germany three 
times to discuss the HILT instrument design 
and work out interface details. Although 
these trips were highly enjoyable, each trip 
uncovered significant problems that we were 
able to resolve early on. It is doubtful these 
problems would have been uncovered until 
the instrument was delivered for integration 
had we not traveled to Germany, talked with 
the engineers and seen the actual hardware. 
The same was true with the LEICA 
instrument which was developed at the 
University of Maryland. Since Maryland is 
within easy driving distance we were able to 
work closely with LEICA engineers to resolve 
all problems. 
On the other hand, we (mechanical 
group) never traveled to the west coast or 
saw the MAST/PET instrument until it was 
delivered for integration. The instrument was 
to be assembled from parts on the shelf to 
old specifications which were supposedly 
well defined. The actual instrument, when it 
arrived, violated its ICD and would not fit in 
the spacecraft structure. The structural 
integrity of the instrument enclosure was also 
questionable. To make a long story short it 
cost us $17,000 to modify the spacecraft 
structure and redesign and rebuild the 
instrument enclosure. Add to that several 
weeks of civil service manpower, Swales 
analysis and the cost of vibration testing of 
the instrument and we could have paid for 
more than a few trips to the west coast. 
1. SAMPEX Lessons Learned: Mechanical Subsystem 
James W. Kellogg, Lead Mechanical Engineer SAMPEX 
Section Head Code 741.1, GSFC 
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